1. Chairman Cirio, in a Europe that is simultaneously focused on competitiveness, the green transition, and economic security, what specific priorities will you place at the center of the ECON Committee’s work? And on which issues will it be inevitable to reach difficult compromises?
The CoR’s ECON Commission, which I have the honour of chairing, must first and foremost ensure that European competitiveness does not remain merely a slogan, but translates into concrete opportunities for local and regional areas. The document we have adopted identifies a clear priority: building an industrial policy that is truly rooted in local and regional areas, capable of supporting decarbonization without weakening Europe’s productive fabric. Today, many major European initiatives, from the Clean Industrial Deal to the future European Competitiveness Fund, risk being designed without sufficient attention to regional differences. Our task will be to bring the voices of cities and regions to the forefront of these decisions.
The second priority concerns digital transformation and strategic technologies. We cannot accept that the technological gap between regions widens any further. Artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital infrastructure, the cloud, and quantum technologies represent the new frontier of European competitiveness. The ECON Committee will work to ensure that European resources effectively reach local authorities, SMEs, and innovative projects on the ground, while simultaneously strengthening the resilience of our public administrations and critical infrastructure. The goal is to ensure that the AI revolution is not concentrated in just a few areas of Europe but becomes a driver of widespread growth for all regions. In this context, the Chips Act 2.0 (presented a few weeks ago by the EU Commission) represents a particularly important step. It is extremely positive news that, for the first time in a strategic proposal of this magnitude, the European Commission has dedicated an entire section to the regional dimension. This is a significant recognition of the work carried out by the European Alliance of Semiconductor Regions (ESRA), which I had the honour of co-chairing last year alongside Regional Councilor Andrea Tronzano, and of the contribution made by the European Committee of the Regions.
A cornerstone of the ECON Committee’s agenda will be the single market. At a time marked by geopolitical tensions, protectionism, and growing global competition, Europe must eliminate the barriers that still hinder businesses and investment. For this reason, we will closely monitor the Single Market Strategy, the revision of public procurement rules, and administrative simplification measures. European competitiveness also depends on the ability to reduce the bureaucratic burdens that weigh most heavily on small and medium-sized enterprises. Another key priority will be investment. With the conclusion of Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan and the start of the debate on the EU’s next multiannual budget, we must ensure that the regions play a full role in shaping European strategies. Local and regional authorities are called upon to carry out a large part of the investments needed for the green, digital, and social transitions, but they often have limited fiscal leeway. ECON will therefore continue to support economic governance that better recognizes the territorial dimension of development. Of course, the most difficult trade-offs will concern the balance between competitiveness and sustainability. We will need to support industrial decarbonization without jeopardizing the viability of strategic sectors such as the automotive, chemical, and steel industries, as well as energy-intensive sectors. This is a challenge that requires a delicate balance: accelerating the ecological transition while simultaneously preserving jobs, investments, and Europe’s productive capacity.
2. When it comes to artificial intelligence, the risk is a multi-speed Europe. How can the AI Act be implemented without penalising SMEs, industrial regions and areas that are less technologically advanced?
Piemonte plays a central role in the European strategy on artificial intelligence. Last year, I was the rapporteur for the CoR’s opinion on the application of artificial intelligence in the public sector, with a particular focus on its efficiency, including in safeguarding and supporting small businesses and the most vulnerable and least-connected regions.
I would also like to highlight the role we played in drafting the new CHIPS Act 2.0, which the European Commission has submitted to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. This introduces, for the first time, a structured and recognised role for the regions in the development of European semiconductor policy, semiconductors being the fuel of artificial intelligence: this is a fundamental step that enhances the role of the regions, and one that we have achieved thanks in part to the work carried out by Piedmont during its presidency of the European Semiconductor Regions Alliance (ESRA), which led the European institutions to formally recognise the contribution of the regions to the development of the continental semiconductor ecosystem. For Piemonte, which in recent years has consolidated its position in the automotive, aerospace, advanced electronics and microelectronics sectors, the new European framework represents a significant opportunity for growth and for further consolidating its industrial leadership, increasing the international visibility of its industrial and technological ecosystems, encouraging new investment and strengthening production chains.
3. The European automotive sector is under pressure from the green transition and global competition: what European measures (industrial, commercial and relating to state aid) are truly necessary today to prevent a structural loss of production capacity?
The automotive sector is not merely an economic sector: it is one of the cornerstones of European industry. In Piemonte, we are well aware of this, because an ecosystem has developed around the automotive industry that involves large companies, thousands of SMEs, research centres and tens of thousands of skilled workers. The challenge of the environmental transition is real and cannot be postponed. However, it is important that this is, in fact, a transition, to prevent decarbonisation from turning into deindustrialisation. If we lose manufacturing capacity in Europe, we risk becoming dependent on other continents for the very technologies that should secure our future.
This is why we need stronger European industrial policies that take a holistic view of sustainability: for the environment, of course, but also for the manufacturing sector, jobs and families. European businesses are investing in the green transition and in innovation, but to continue doing so they need an environment that recognises the value of these efforts and ensures market conditions comparable to those of their main global competitors. The transition will therefore succeed if we can combine environmental sustainability, industrial competitiveness and the protection of local jobs.
4. Europe’s competitiveness also depends on its ability to retain industrial investment in the face of competition from the United States and China. Do you think the EU should change its approach to state aid and its common industrial policy?
Let’s look at the facts as they stand. The United States has put $370 billion on the table through the Inflation Reduction Act to support its own industry. China has been pursuing a highly effective and coordinated public industrial policy for years. Against this backdrop, Europe cannot continue to respond with tools designed for a world that no longer exists.
On the issue of state aid, there is an ongoing debate in Europe that must be addressed honestly. Relaxing national restrictions may seem like a quick fix, but on its own it risks increasing disparities within the Union. If we leave individual Member States free to support their own businesses without a common framework, the result will be that those with greater fiscal leeway will have a head start. And this would further fragment the single market, which is, in fact, one of our strengths. The right answer lies elsewhere: a genuine, ambitious European industrial policy capable of mobilising joint investment in strategic technological innovation, clean energy and innovation. The Draghi Report has documented this with very clear data: the competitiveness gap with the United States cannot be closed with minor adjustments. It requires a step-up in investment and in our capacity to act together as Europe.
And on this point, I would like to add something that is particularly close to my heart. European competitiveness is not built solely in Brussels. It is built in the regions, in industrial supply chains, in manufacturing clusters, in universities and in local research centres. Involving the regions in this process is not a question of representation, but a question of effectiveness. Because that is where the expertise, the businesses and the practical ability to transform public investment into real growth lie.
5. With regard to the European Business Wallet project, Brussels is promising less red tape and a simpler single market for businesses. What needs to happen for this to actually work, rather than it remaining merely another new European digital tool on paper? Are all Member States ready to implement the EBW?
The European Business Wallet is a project which, on paper, is hard not to support. At present, a business wishing to operate in another European country must gather documents, certificates and translations, and have them authenticated each time, for every administrative body. It is a waste of time and money that particularly penalises small and medium-sized enterprises, which do not have dedicated legal departments. If we can truly provide every European company with a digital identity recognised throughout the Union, it would be a concrete step towards a functioning single market.
For this reason, the European Business Wallet is a tool that is heading in the right direction, and as Chair of the ECON Committee, I have been able to follow its development right from the early consultation stages. The Commission estimates savings of up to €150 billion a year for European businesses: figures which, if confirmed, would be transformative. But precisely for this reason, we cannot allow it to remain a tool that looks good on paper but is inconsistent in practice. The problem is that there is always a critical step between the proposal and its actual impact: implementation. We are talking about a regulation that will not come into force before 2027, with a further two or three years for public administrations to adapt. So the realistic operational timeframe is 2029–2030. In the meantime, businesses continue to wait.
To ensure this does not remain merely a paper exercise, two things in particular are needed. First of all, national business registers must be truly interoperable. Secondly, regions and local authorities must be given the practical means to adapt, with resources and technical support. We are not the last link in the European chain, but the first point of contact with local businesses. If we do not start out prepared, the system will not work. As for the Member States’ preparedness, I am realistic: the picture is mixed. Some countries already have mature digital infrastructure and will have a head start, whilst others are catching up on historical deficits and need Europe to support their investments.
6. There has been much discussion in recent months about the ‘EU Inc.’ proposal, that is, the idea of a European corporate framework. Is this a realistic way to strengthen European competitiveness, or is there a risk of creating tensions with Member States’ national regulations and tax systems?
EU Inc. addresses a real problem. Today, a European company wishing to expand into another Member State faces a completely different legal system in terms of contracts, governance and directors’ liabilities. This entails enormous costs, especially for those who are not multinationals with dozens of lawyers at their disposal. The idea of a harmonised, optional, digital European company framework with rapid registration is a step in the right direction. We must break down the invisible barriers that prevent European businesses from growing to the scale needed to compete with the United States and China. That said, I expect the legislative debate to address honestly certain issues that the proposal currently leaves open. The most sensitive issue is not company law itself but everything surrounding it: taxation, labour law and insolvency rules. On these issues, competence remains with the Member States and the differences are profound. The real risk - which must be avoided - is that ‘EU Inc.’ will become a harmonised shell with a still-fragmented content: useful for setting up a registered office, but far less so for managing a business that actually operates across several countries.